
Business As Usual: Indiana's Response to the Confederate Invasions of the Summer of 1863

*Scott Roller**

Historical treatments of the Confederate invasions of Indiana in 1863 have portrayed the raids as aberrations that had little or no enduring impact aside from producing a slightly better organized militia and a wealth of folklore. What such interpretations have failed to investigate is how and why the unity that was produced by the military threat to the state was so quickly dissolved after the danger had passed. Indeed, historians generally agree that the unity was short lived, but none have analyzed why this was the case. A closer examination of the guerrilla raids of General John Hunt Morgan and Captain Thomas H. Hines reveals that the causes of this rapid disintegration of solidarity among Hoosiers may be found both in the divisive party issues of the day and in the unique circumstances created by the raids themselves. Because of the unified response they engendered, these events had the potential to reduce or even eliminate the partisan accusations of widespread disloyalty in the state. Instead, both Republicans and Democrats chose to ignore the possible political implications of the raids and to perpetuate the extreme political hyperbole that had existed previously.

The physical and psychological stress of civil war, the intense divisions between supporters and opponents of the conflict, and the social and economic changes at home caused many members of both political parties in the Hoosier state to become, at times, overzealous. Believing that peace could be brought about only through armed conflict, Republican leaders denounced as disloyal virtually everyone who did not support all aspects of the war. By equating dissent with treason they created among their constituents an unfounded fear of their Democratic neighbors. The Republicans' posi-

* Scott Roller currently holds the position of collections manager/registrar at the Putnam Museum of History and Natural Science, Davenport, Iowa.

tion as the incumbent party was paramount to the perpetuation of these charges of disloyalty. Republicans had at their disposal the means to suppress treason wherever they found it, and they used this power to their political advantage. In support of their accusations of treason they discovered numerous disloyal activities that they attributed to members of the Democratic party, including a plot to kill Republican Governor Oliver P. Morton, evidence of cooperation with Kentucky guerrilla bands, and the existence of the Knights of the Golden Circle, a subversive organization that allegedly existed in the Midwest during the war.¹

In part, Democrats themselves brought on Republican charges and criticism. By the fall of 1862 in Indiana, as elsewhere in the North, the Democracy had become predominantly an opposition party. As Republicans put forth increasingly radical policies with regard to enlarging governmental powers, Democrats became ever more vigilant in their defense of antebellum conservatism. In desperate attempts to regain their dominance in Indiana politics, Democratic editors and politicians appealed to the emotional issues of racism and attempted to rekindle old fears of sectional domination by New England on issues such as the tariff, internal improvements, and banking legislation. Their constant objections to Republican initiatives garnered them a reputation among many as a purely negative party.²

Because Democrats had dominated the political scene in Indiana from 1843 until at least 1854, Republicans did not find it easy to discredit them. By late 1862 the implementation of the draft and Lincoln's announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation, along with disheartening news from the war front, allowed the Demo-

¹ For general discussions of Republican politics in Indiana during the Civil War see Kenneth M. Stampp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War* (Indiana Historical Collections, Vol. XXXI; Indianapolis, 1949); Emma Lou Thornbrough, *Indiana in the Civil War Era, 1850-1880* (Indianapolis, 1965); William Dudley Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton* (2 vols., Indianapolis, 1899); James Albert Woodburn, "Party Politics in Indiana during the Civil War," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902* (1903), I, 225-51; John D. Barnhart, "The Impact of the Civil War on Indiana," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LVII (September, 1961), 185-224. See also Frank L. Klement, *Copperheads in the Middle West* (Chicago, 1960), 134-69; Frank L. Klement, "Carrington and the Golden Circle Legend in Indiana during the Civil War," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LXI (March, 1965), 31-52.

² For treatments of Democratic opposition in Indiana politics during the Civil War see note 1 above; see also Gilbert R. Tredway, *Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana* (Indiana Historical Collections, Vol. XLVIII; Indianapolis, 1973); Wood Gray, *The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads* (New York, 1942); Joel H. Silbey, *A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860-1868* (New York, 1977); Robert H. Abzug, "The Copperheads: Historical Approaches to Civil War Dissent in the Midwest," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LXVI (March, 1970), 40-55; Richard O. Curry, "The Union as it Was: A Critique of Recent Interpretations of the 'Copperheads,'" *Civil War History*, XIII (March, 1967), 25-39.

crats to win control of both houses of the General Assembly in the fall elections.³ This victory eventually led to a Republican bolt from the legislature near the end of the session of 1863, ostensibly in an attempt to prevent Democrats from passing bills that would severely curtail the powers of Governor Morton and hinder his support of the war effort. The Republicans' refusal to return for the remainder of the session brought the General Assembly to a standstill. The offensive Democratic legislation was not passed, but neither were any appropriation bills, leaving the Republican administration with no funds to run the state government. Jubilant Democrats looked forward to a special session, but, through the acquisition of financial aid from outside sources and the legally dubious but careful management of this money by the governor himself, the state remained solvent until the next regularly scheduled session of the General Assembly in January, 1865.⁴

As early as January, 1863, one Republican leader in Indiana noted, "Our reverses have been so frequent and so uncalled for [that] the people have become tired & discouraged."⁵ As the year progressed, continued military setbacks, the emergence of a strong Democratic peace movement, and periodic violent resistance to the draft led some Republicans to fear an uprising against the government at home.⁶ By June, 1863, Union morale had reached its nadir.

Such was the state of Indiana politics when the dashing young Confederate Captain Thomas H. Hines crossed the Ohio River near Cannelton, Indiana, on the night of June 17, 1863. Having been ordered to run a convalescent camp in Kentucky for broken down horses, Hines had received permission from General Morgan to "scout north of the Cumberland river" to obtain recruits and fresh mounts. Finding himself the target of Federal troops in Kentucky, Hines decided to elude his pursuers by crossing the Ohio River. Once in Indiana Hines and his force of about eighty men continued their search for horses while masquerading as a company of "Indiana Greys" looking for deserters.⁷

³ Tredway, *Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration*, 8-17 *passim*; Stamp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War*, 128-57 *passim*; Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton*, I, 203-20; Thornbrough, *Indiana in the Civil War Era*, 118-23.

⁴ For a summation of the session and Morton's subsequent financial dealings see Stamp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War Era*, 176-85.

⁵ Calvin Fletcher diary, January 4, 1863, Calvin Fletcher Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library, Indianapolis).

⁶ For example see Henry B. Carrington to Edwin M. Stanton, March 19, 1863, U. S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (128 vols., Washington, D. C., 1880-1901), ser. 2, vol. V, pp. 363-67. This work is hereafter cited as *Official Records*.

⁷ James Blanton, "Account of Raids Made into Kentucky by Gen. Morgan and Capt. Hines," 53-54, Thomas H. Hines Papers (University of Kentucky Library, Lexington).

Whether or not Hines expected to get any support in Indiana from the Democrats or the Knights of the Golden Circle, he soon found that when it came to an invasion of their state Hoosiers laid aside all political differences.⁸ Upon discovering Hines's presence, citizens and poorly organized and undrilled Home Guard units rushed to apprehend his party. On June 19, after pursuing Hines and his men from the outskirts of Paoli to the Ohio River where the ford that the Confederates had planned to use was blocked by state militia, a group of citizens trapped Hines's troops on an island. The captain and a few of his men escaped by swimming the swift current to the Kentucky shore, but the bulk of his force surrendered without a fight.⁹ So reassuring was the enthusiastic and unified response to the raid that even the *Madison Daily Courier*, a Republican organ, proclaimed, "Let it no longer be said that rebels and guerrillas have sympathizers among the people of Southern Indiana."¹⁰ If Hines had expected any support from the Indiana Democracy, he had been rudely disappointed.

Perhaps the Hines raid should have assured doubtful Republicans that their Democratic neighbors, though they might be averse to the aims and conduct of the war, were nonetheless fully prepared to defend their homes and had no intention of aiding a rebel invasion. Yet, despite the suspension of most partisan bickering during the raid itself, the habits of party politics were hard to break. While some Democrats joined those Republicans who praised the nonpartisan response to the threat, many took advantage of their new proof of loyalty to criticize and discredit Republican allegations to the contrary.¹¹ Other Democrats were apparently uninterested in capitalizing on the patriotic response of their party members during the raid. The most influential Democratic newspaper in the state, the *Indianapolis State Sentinel*, used the raid as a means to criticize the actions of the Indiana Home

⁸ Lieutenant Joseph Haycroft, who was taken prisoner during the Hines Raid, said he thought from reading Indiana newspapers that "the Democrats would all be rebels" and that Hines had expected "that he would be warmly welcomed by citizens of Indiana, and that they would flock to his standard." *New Albany Daily Ledger*, June 22, 1863. General Basil W. Duke of John Hunt Morgan's command expressed a similar opinion, writing that Hines had crossed into Indiana to "try and stir up the 'copperheads.'" Basil W. Duke, *A History of Morgan's Cavalry* (1867; reprint, Bloomington, Ind., 1960), 431. Other accounts by members of Hines's command suggest that his object was simply to steal horses. *Madison Daily Courier*, June 24, 1863. For an example of the suspension of partisan politics see *Paoli American Eagle*, July 2, 1863.

⁹ William H. H. Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Indiana* (8 vols., Indianapolis, 1866-1869), I, 161-65; Blanton, "Account of Raids Made into Kentucky," 57. Accounts of the number of Confederates that escaped range from three in Terrell to as many as twelve in Blanton.

¹⁰ *Madison Daily Courier*, June 25, 1863.

¹¹ For praise see *New Albany Daily Ledger*, June 23, 1863. For criticism of Republican allegations see *Paoli American Eagle*, July 2, 1863.

Morgan's Raid



THOMAS H. HINES

Courtesy The Filson Club,
Louisville, Kentucky.

Guards and thus the Republican administration itself. Upset by the part that these units had taken in harassing Democrats and suppressing antiwar opinions, the *Sentinel* turned the tables and sarcastically questioned the loyalty of the Home Guards. According to the newspaper, going to the border to defend the state did not necessarily indicate good intentions. An unsuccessful campaign against the "horse thieves" might suggest instead "a bond of sympathy between those who cross the river to steal horses and those who stay at home to steal arms."¹²

Aside from the new political controversies that it created, the Hines raid also had a psychological impact on many Hoosiers. For

¹² Indianapolis *Daily State Sentinel*, June 20, 1863. For allegations of Home Guard harassment see Indianapolis *Indiana State Sentinel*, June 22, 1863.

the first time since the war had begun, a significant enemy force had entered the state.¹³ With reports of Robert E. Lee's northward movements into Pennsylvania coming over the telegraph wires and a false rumor on June 21 of a second Confederate invasion of Indiana by a force of five hundred to nine hundred men, the feeling in southern counties of the state became one of caution.¹⁴ As men mobilized for defense during the second scare, it became apparent that such caution was not at all unfounded. There were few companies ready to meet the raid and of those that hurriedly organized in the midst of the presumed threat, most had no arms or ammunition.¹⁵ Somewhat surprisingly it was the Democratic press that, while praising the turnout in response to the threats of invasion, urged the people of the border counties to prepare themselves better for future emergencies.¹⁶

Nevertheless, because the Hines threat had been met quickly and successfully, the inadequacies of the state forces were largely ignored, and the mood of most Hoosiers was one of confidence and security. The Madison *Daily Courier* promised its readers during the false alarm that the rebels were being easily dealt with and that "their capture is confidently expected."¹⁷ At Indianapolis, a city that had not yet been physically threatened by an invasion, the mood was also one of assurance. In response to a report that the Confederates of the second invasion were planning an attack on their city the *Sentinel* boasted: "In this they are mistaken. If their force is only nine hundred, . . . they can only reach here as prisoners."¹⁸ Even state officials who probably should have realized the limitations of local defense preparations seemed unconcerned. Their confidence stemmed from their belief that the few regiments of regular troops stationed at Indianapolis were more than adequate for the protection of the capital and could quickly be sent to the southern portions of the state by rail if the need for them arose.¹⁹ Although Governor Morton was in New York City trying to obtain funding for the state government at the time of the Hines

¹³ The only earlier force of any consequence was an independent guerrilla group of thirty-two men under Adam R. Johnson who raided Newburgh, Indiana, in July, 1862. See Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 143-46.

¹⁴ For rumors see *New Albany Daily Ledger*, June 22, 23, 1863.

¹⁵ Governor's Telegraphic Correspondence, General Telegrams, vol. XI, pp. 79-85 *passim*, Oliver P. Morton Papers (Archives Division, Indiana Commission on Public Records, Indiana State Library and Historical Building, Indianapolis).

¹⁶ *Paoli American Eagle*, July 2, 1863; *New Albany Daily Ledger*, June 20, 22, 1863. The *Paoli American Eagle* noted that it was a group of citizens and not the state militia that had captured Hines's men; see *Paoli American Eagle*, July 2, 1863; Jno. R. Simpson to William R. Holloway, June 20, 1863, Governor's Telegraphic Correspondence, vol. XI, p. 71, Morton Papers.

¹⁷ *Madison Daily Courier*, June 23, 1863.

¹⁸ *Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel*, June 23, 1863.

¹⁹ A force was sent during the false alarm of June 21, 1863, by Adjutant General Lazarus Noble. *Paoli American Eagle*, July 2, 1863.

raid, his personal secretary kept him abreast of the situation and assured his chief that the first group of rebels had been easily captured and that there was little or no excitement in Indianapolis concerning the second invasion.²⁰

As the rumors of raids died down, the people of Indiana returned to their normal way of life. In June the wheat harvest was in full swing, and the task, made even more difficult with many of the men away at war, occupied virtually every waking hour.²¹ Moreover, in the absence of a direct threat the organization of defense companies no longer seemed relevant. Hearing no reports of Confederate forces any nearer than Tennessee, Hoosiers quickly became preoccupied with other obligations and apparently regained confidence in the state's military preparations. Indeed, for the purposes of repulsing small unorganized guerrilla bands such defenses were sufficient, but on July 2 a larger force of 2,460 men and four pieces of artillery under the command of General Morgan were setting out from Burkesville, Kentucky.²² Hoosiers' reactions to the combination of events during the following week would prove to have great political repercussions in Indiana.

After slipping past the Federal forces in southern Kentucky, Morgan rapidly traversed the Bluegrass state, meeting only slight resistance while cutting telegraph lines, transmitting false telegraphic dispatches, and sending out scouting parties in all directions.²³ By the time he reached the town of Brandenburg on the southern bank of the Ohio River, he had fully confused the Federal authorities.²⁴

Generals Ambrose E. Burnside and Jeremiah T. Boyle, the Union commanders at Cincinnati and Louisville respectively, had not an inkling of Morgan's intentions but from the reports they received expected that he was heading for Louisville.²⁵ In order to

²⁰ William R. Holloway to Morton, June 22, 1863, Governor's Telegraphic Correspondence, vol. XI, pp. 86-89, Morton Papers.

²¹ Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 178; Frances Higgins, "With Morgan's Men at Wood Hall Farm," United States History mss. (Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington); Emma Ely to Edna Van Pelt, July 13, 1863, Mathias C. Van Pelt Family Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library).

²² Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 415. The number of troops that Morgan was reported to have varied greatly, but estimates by Confederates in the raid are all similar to Duke's. Union estimates generally ranged from four thousand to eight thousand.

²³ For examples of confusion caused by false dispatches and the skill of Morgan's telegraph operator, George A. Ellsworth, see *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXIII, pt. 1, pp. 702-703; James A. Ramage, *Rebel Raider: The Life of General John Hunt Morgan* (Lexington, Ky., 1986), 166; Harold Swiggett, *The Rebel Raider: A Life of John Hunt Morgan* (Garden City, N. Y., 1934), 61, 66; William E. Wilson, "Thunderbolt of the Confederacy, or King of the Horse Thieves," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LIV (June, 1958), 126.

²⁴ For accounts of Morgan's raid through Kentucky see Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 414-31; Ramage, *Rebel Raider*, 158-69.

²⁵ *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXIII, pt. 1, p. 679-710 *passim*.

defend that city and the supplies located there, Burnside ordered virtually all the remaining regular troops and artillery away from Indianapolis on July 4, leaving the capital without any substantial means of defense.²⁶

Though Indiana Governor Morton, like Burnside and Boyle, could not be sure of Morgan's objectives, he was much more concerned about a possible invasion of his state. He had cause to be worried. One of the few who had realized after the Hines raid that the state was poorly prepared to defend itself, Morton had requested twenty-five thousand arms and twelve pieces of artillery from Washington on June 29, but they had yet to arrive.²⁷ Upon hearing of Morgan's presence in Kentucky, Morton had also called out the Indiana Legion, as the state militia forces were known, and sent Adjutant General Lazarus Noble to Louisville with "full power" over that body in hopes of stopping Morgan before he could reach the Ohio River.²⁸ By July 6, however, reports from Boyle and others convinced Morton that the threat of invasion was not serious, and he halted the mobilization of the Legion until further notice.²⁹

While Federal authorities frantically attempted to discern Morgan's position and intentions, the people of Indiana remained largely unaware that a threat existed. The first public reports that Morgan had even entered Kentucky did not appear in Indianapolis until July 6, and the news did not appear in the southern Indiana newspapers until the next day or later.³⁰ The lack of information concerning Morgan's advance was due to both poor communications and the widespread assumption that Morgan's aim was Louisville. So confused were the Federal authorities by Morgan's maneuvers, in fact, that the Confederate general had already captured two steamboats and crossed his entire force into Indiana before reports of his whereabouts reached them. Even when these reports were received, Burnside doubted their veracity, still believing Louisville to be Morgan's main objective.³¹ In the many Indi-

²⁶ Ambrose E. Burnside to Orlando B. Willcox, July 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 685. Troop movements were ordered at the request of Boyle. See Jeremiah T. Boyle to Burnside, July 4, 1863, *ibid.*, 682. Terrell states that this action "left Indianapolis, of United States troops, only two companies of the Sixty-Third Indiana, doing guard duty at the Soldiers' Home, some hundreds of recently exchanged prisoners of the Fifty-First and Seventy-Third Indiana, and a small number of recruits." Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 174.

²⁷ Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 174.

²⁸ Morton to Boyle, July 4, 1863, Governor's Telegraphic Correspondence, vol. XVI, p. 232, Morton Papers.

²⁹ Morton to Boyle, July 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 234; Boyle to Morton, July 6, 1863, *ibid.*, 235; various dispatches, July 6, 1863, *ibid.*, vol. XI, p. 126.

³⁰ Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, July 6, 1863; Indianapolis *Indiana State Sentinel*, July 6, 1863; New Albany *Daily Ledger*, July 7, 1863.

³¹ Burnside to Boyle, July 8, 1863, *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXIII, pt. 1, p. 705. The confusion created by Morgan in Kentucky is elucidated in *ibid.*, 633-711 *passim*.



GOVERNOR OLIVER P. MORTON

Courtesy Indiana Historical
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ana newspaper reports of the raid printed before it was known that Morgan had crossed the Ohio River, there was no speculation whatsoever that so large a force could effect a successful crossing.³² Not until after Morgan had already disposed of the token resistance he had met at the border and had crossed into Indiana were most Hoosiers cognizant that a threat existed.

During the few days preceding Morgan's crossing, Indiana, like most of the northern states, had celebrated the news of Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Thus, when the firebells rang and runners went through the border counties with the alarm that Morgan and a force of from four thousand to eight thousand men had entered the state, the people were caught off guard, and pandemonium ensued. As Morgan's troops were helping themselves to the spoils of war at Corydon, where they had attacked and captured some 350 Home Guards who had hurriedly formed in an attempt to defend the town, the Indiana countryside was finally

³² For reports that Louisville was Morgan's target see *Indianapolis Daily Journal*, July 7, 1863; *Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel*, July 7, 8, 1863.

beginning to come alive.³³ Men from all over the state hurried to Indianapolis in response to Governor Morton's call for "all able bodied white male citizens" to organize in companies.³⁴

From both military and emotional standpoints Indiana's reaction to Morgan's raid greatly resembled that which had followed the news of Fort Sumter in 1861.³⁵ The most obvious similarity was the supreme confidence the raw volunteers had in their natural martial abilities. The Lawrenceburg *Democratic Register*, evidently writing from inaccurate preliminary reports that only a part of Morgan's force had entered Indiana, lamented that it was "a pity that the whole command did not cross over, for it is morally certain that not one of those now on this side of the river, or those who follow, will ever return except as prisoners." Rather optimistically it added, "This raid has not been unexpected, and preparations have no doubt been made for it."³⁶ At Madison the editor of the *Courier* was even more assured of a victory, insisting that the city was "actively prepar[ed] for a war fandango. . . . So if the Secesh pay us a visit, our rollicking Legion and Homeguards will teach the plunderers their steps, put them through their paces and finish by initiating them in the saltatory mysteries of the *gallopade*."³⁷ Everywhere the excitement raised the spirits of Hoosiers, most of whom sincerely believed that they were fully prepared to meet the invasion.³⁸

³³ For excitement and organization of troops see Ramage, *Rebel Raider*, 170-71; Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 434-35; James A. Ramage, "Indiana's Response to John Hunt Morgan's Raid," *Journal of the Jackson Purchase Historical Society*, VIII (June, 1980), 4-5; Alice Ann Bundy, "A Glimpse of Pioneer Life in Jennings County," 142-43, Alice Ann Bundy Papers (Indiana Division, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis); Higgins, "With Morgan's Men at Wood Hall Farm," United States History mss.; Oliver C. Haskell diary, July 9, 1863, Oliver C. Haskell Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library); Marie Ester Brandt diary, July 9-11, 1863, Marie Ester Brandt Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library); Martha E. (Hutchings) Griffith journal, July 10, 1863, Griffith Papers (Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington); Emma Ely to Edna Van Pelt, July 13, 1863, Mathias C. Van Pelt Family Papers; Carrie Naylor to William R. Lowes, July 10, 1863, William R. Lowes Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library); Harrison Daily to "Father," July 9, 1863, David W. Daily Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library).

³⁴ For Morton's requests for troops see Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, statistics and documents, p. 300; Madison *Daily Courier*, July 10, 11, 1863; Governor's Telegraphic Correspondence, vol. XI, p. 133ff., Morton Papers. Approximately sixty-five thousand men gathered around the state within forty-eight hours of Morton's call, twenty thousand in Indianapolis alone, making the capital city look like a "huge barrack." For information on organization and excitement in Indianapolis see Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 178-79; Ramage, "Indiana's Response to Morgan's Raid," 4; Lizzie Wilkens to [John Adam Wilkens?], July 21, 1863, John Adam Wilkens Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library); Frank Ingersoll to "Sister," July 15, [1863], Frank Ingersoll Papers (Lilly Library, Indiana University).

³⁵ Stamp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War*, 206.

³⁶ Lawrenceburg *Democratic Register*, July 10, 1863.

³⁷ Madison *Daily Courier*, July 10, 1863.

³⁸ One example of such optimism is found in a letter written early in the raid

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS
OF THE
"LEGION" AND "MINUTE MEN" OF INDIANA.

Having received information that a rebel force, estimated to be six thousand strong, with six pieces of artillery, had crossed the Ohio river into Harrison county, I issued a call on Thursday last, to the patriotic citizens of the State, to leave their various occupations and turn out for its defence, and if possible capture the insolent invaders. The evidence was abundant that the original purpose of the rebels was to seize, plunder and burn the Capital, but as their course would be uncertain it was necessary to make preparations to encounter them in every direction. Within forty-eight hours from the time the call was issued, not less than sixty-five thousand men had tendered their services and were on their way to places of rendezvous, while many thousands more were preparing, but were notified to remain at home. Within three days thirty thousand men, fully armed and organized, had taken the field at various points to meet the enemy.

This wonderful uprising will exert a marked effect throughout the country, exhibiting, as it does, in the strongest and most favorable light, the military spirit and patriotism of our people.

At the first landing on our soil the rebel advance was met and fought by the neighboring "Legion," and, although our forces were few in number and were driven back, they gave the rebels a clear foretaste of what they might expect when they penetrated the interior of the State. Within ten hours after they entered our borders their invasion was converted into a rapid and desperate flight. In whatever direction they turned they were confronted by large bodies of armed men. Wherever they approached the river, with the view to crossing, they found large bodies of troops prepared to dispute their passage. In half a dozen cases they were offered battle which they invariably declined. They dodged and ran by night and by day and finally succeeded in making their escape over our eastern border into Ohio.

They are reported to have murdered several of our citizens in cold blood, to have plundered many of their horses, money and goods, and to have burned and otherwise destroyed much valuable property. The injury done to the Rail Roads was slight, and has been almost entirely repaired. They had but little time to do damage beyond the murder and plunder of surprised and defenceless citizens along the line of their flight.

For the alacrity with which you responded to my call and left your harvest fields, your workshops and offices, and took up arms to protect your State and punish the invaders, allow me, on behalf of the State, to tender my hearty thanks. Your example will not be lost upon the Nation, and you have taught the rebels a lesson which will not be forgotten.

In the light of these events it is impossible not to perceive the importance of a thorough organization of the Legion. The presence of an organized force ready to take the field at a moment's notice is a standing security against invasion and depredation, and I am very anxious that so far as it is possible the temporary organizations of the "Minute Men" may be converted into permanent ones under the law; and that exertions will everywhere be made to recruit the ranks of the Legion and perfect its drill and efficiency.

Given at the Executive Department, Indianapolis, Indiana,

this 15th day of July, 1863.

OLIVER P. MORTON,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

Despite the grandiose rhetoric and overwhelming enthusiasm, the Indiana militia lacked the military capabilities to challenge seriously a veteran guerrilla cavalry force.³⁹ Very few preparations had been made for the defense of the border since the Hines raid, and the hasty attempt to organize companies around the state proved to be chaotic as few of the men had any military experience and those that did often bickered over who should be in charge.⁴⁰ Some areas failed to organize in time because the people still doubted that the raid was in progress until it was too late.⁴¹ More detrimental to the safety of the state, however, was the lack of arms and ammunition. A great number of companies had none at all. In other cases arms were either such obscure makes or so out of date that the proper ammunition was no longer produced. Not only were arms and ammunition not in the hands of the defenders of the state but there were few available to ship to them, so while Morton was busy obtaining a shipment of muskets from St. Louis, ammunition was frantically being prepared in Indianapolis.⁴²

The result of the lack of preparation was predictable: by executing simple flanking movements Morgan easily swept aside the few forces, such as those at Corydon, that dared to attempt to slow him down.⁴³ As Morgan continued his way across southern Indiana, his men captured and paroled a small force at Salem as well as the many careless Hoosier scouts they encountered along the

by the editor of the Indianapolis *Saturday Evening Mirror* to his uncle in Kentucky. The Hoosier expressed his belief that by the time his letter was received the "Morgan scare . . . will have become the amusement and laughing stock of the whole country. Surely no fool would expect to conquer Indiana with less than forty times Johns number . . . and though we are cursed with sympathizing traitors at home we are abundantly able to take care of ourselves yet." William B. Vickers to Robert H. Hitch, July 10, 1863, William B. Vickers Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library). See also New Albany *Daily Ledger*, July 9, 1863.

³⁹ Duke, having just come from "thinned out 'Dixie,'" was amazed by the large turnout for defense. He noted that "the ranks of the militia were full. I am satisfied that we saw often as many as ten thousand militia in one day, posted at different points. They would frequently fight, if attacked in strong position, but could be dispersed by maneuvering. Had they come upon us as the fierce Kentucky Homeguards would have done, if collected in such numbers, we could not have forced our way through them." Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 439.

⁴⁰ Indianapolis *Daily State Sentinel*, July 22, 1863.

⁴¹ Carrie Naylor to William R. Lowes, July 10, 1863, William R. Lowes Papers; James P. Banta diary, July 8, 9, 1863, James P. Banta Papers (Lilly Library, Indiana University).

⁴² Governor's Telegraphic Correspondence, vol. XI, p. 133ff., Morton Papers; Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 174-76.

⁴³ Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 439. For other general accounts of the raid through Indiana and Ohio see Ramage, *Rebel Raider*, 170-82; Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 170-96; Margrette Boyer, "Morgan's Raid in Indiana," *Indiana Magazine of History*, VIII (December, 1912), 149-65; Wilson, "Thunderbolt of the Confederacy," 119-30; Ramage, "Indiana's Response to Morgan's Raid," 1-9. For accounts of the engagement at Corydon see Corydon *Weekly Democrat*, July 14, 1863; New Albany *Daily Ledger*, July 9, 1863; Attia Porter to John C. Andrews, July 30, 1863, Indiana History mss. (Indiana Historical Society Library). W. Fred Conway, *Corydon: The Forgotten Battle of the Civil War* (New Albany, Ind., 1991).

way.⁴⁴ On encountering a more substantial force at Vernon, Morgan held them at bay with a threat of attack while he moved his force peacefully on to the Ohio border.⁴⁵ Although his avoidance of engagements was interpreted as cowardice by most Hoosiers, to stop to fight against any force that could present a challenge to him would have caused critical delays and resulted only in allowing the Union cavalry pursuing from Kentucky to close more quickly. While the Home Guards wanted a chance to prove their manhood in battle, Morgan was more interested in promoting chaos and preserving his force from capture.

The Indiana Home Guards' ignorance of military strategy went beyond their expectations that Morgan should stand and fight to a complete misunderstanding of the guerrilla tactics that he employed along his route. To the people of southern Indiana who had not been introduced to the firsthand realities of war, Morgan's system of replenishing his mounts through the impressment of horses from ordinary citizens was seen as an unmitigated act of theft, and Morgan's name was seldom mentioned without colorful adjectives attached to it such as "King of the American Freebooters" or, more commonly, simply "horse thief."⁴⁶


In some respects such epithets were deserved. Morgan did for a time apparently lose control of his men as they pillaged the retail stores of private citizens. At Salem his men looted without any sort of method in a way that "seemed to be a mania, senseless and purposeless." They took not only necessities such as boots, clothing, and food but also such items as ice skates, a chafing dish, and even "a bird cage, with three canaries in it" despite the fact that items of this sort were cumbersome and useless.⁴⁷ Yet on the whole the value of the items taken by the Confederates was slight. With respect to the personal safety of the inhabitants of the state, Mor-

⁴⁴ For accounts of Morgan at Salem see Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 436-37; Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 184-86; Higgins, "With Morgan's Men at Wood Hall Farm," United States History mss.; Earl Gebhart Hedden, "The Battle of Salem (Indiana) As Told To Me By My Father And It's Sequel," Earl Gebhart Hedden Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library); William Stuart, "Reminiscences of William Stuart, 1887," 72-80, copies, William Stuart Papers, *ibid.*; James P. Banta diary, July 8-13, 1863, Banta Papers.

⁴⁵ For accounts of action at Vernon see Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 437-38; Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 184-86; Griffith journal, July 10-17, 1863, Griffith Papers.

⁴⁶ *Corydon Weekly Democrat*, July 14, 1863.

⁴⁷ Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 436-37. In stealing these articles the Confederates seemed to be paying off the North for the "scores that the Federal army had chalked up in the South." *Ibid.*, 436. Before crossing the Ohio River Sergeant Henry L. Stone wrote that he and his comrades intended "to live off the Yanks hereafter, and let them feel (like the South has felt) some of the horrors of war. Horses we expect to take whenever needed, food and provisions also. . . . I just imagine now how the women will cry their eyes out at seeing a Rebel army." Henry L. Stone to "Dear Father," July 8, 1863, Henry Smith Lane Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library).




gan's men were compassionate compared to the destruction the Union forces inflicted upon the South. In fact, in a letter following the raid one Union soldier admitted to his wife that Morgan's actions were "no worse than we serve the sitayns hears [near Winchester, Tennessee] for we take every thing we can get and burn eny thing of thare fences and tare thare houses down and burn them . . . we take every thing they have we dont leave the first thing for them to live on thare is lots of them now starving for want of soup to eat."⁴⁸ Another wrote simply, "You all have now realized some of the horrors of civil war."⁴⁹

To the uninitiated citizens of Indiana, however, the conduct of Morgan's men was inexcusable, especially since they felt his avoid-

⁴⁸ Benjamin (Benn) Mabrey to Lou Mabrey, July 20, 1863, Benjamin Benn Mabrey Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library).

⁴⁹ Ballard Hardin to Mandy [his sister], July 21, 1863, John J. Hardin and others, Sesquicentennial Mss. Project X42 (Indiana Historical Society Library).



C. C. HASKINS'S SKETCH OF
THE JULY 10, 1863,
LOOTING OF SALEM, INDIANA,
BY GENERAL
JOHN HUNT MORGAN'S TROOPS

Taken from *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, August 8, 1863. Courtesy
Indiana Historical Society Library,
Indianapolis (Neg. no. C4501).

ance of combat denied them a chance at retribution. Ironically, it was precisely because Morgan did not stand and fight that the Home Guards remained confident of their martial abilities. Even at Corydon, where the Indiana militia had quickly surrendered, Hoosiers ignored the outcome and believed that they had been victorious because they had inflicted more casualties than they had received.⁵⁰ Thus, because they were never put to the test, the Indiana militia remained confident throughout the raid that they could crush their opponents if given the chance and continued to blame Morgan's cowardice for their own inability to force him to fight.

Governor Morton and the military commanders of the state, however, began to have much graver doubts as to whether the state forces would be able to deal effectively with Morgan. In ad-

⁵⁰ Corydon *Weekly Democrat*, July 14, 1863.

dition to questioning the loyalty of the people of southern Indiana, the governor feared that Morgan would advance on Indianapolis to release the Confederate prisoners held at Camp Morton, seize the arsenal, and possibly gain control of the entire state. Such apprehensions were perhaps unrealistic; but as Morgan proceeded unmolested toward the Ohio state line, Morton's objective seemed to change from capturing the Confederates to simply slowing them down so Federal forces could catch them or driving them from the state to keep the damage they wrought to a minimum.⁵¹ In addition to the poor preparation made to combat the raid and the lack of arms and ammunition available to deal with it, Indiana had only infantry to meet and check Morgan's cavalry. Indeed, the state "had not more than two hundred" mounted troops available to meet Morgan's veterans.⁵² The dependence on infantry meant that a rapid deployment of large numbers of troops to any specific point required the use of the railroads, which, of course, had been effectively disabled by Morgan to prevent this action.⁵³

Of the few realistic opportunities that the Indiana forces had to intercept Morgan, most were lost because of poor or inexperienced leadership. Perhaps the best chance of obstructing Morgan's progress, however, failed apparently because of sheer negligence. This opportunity occurred on July 13 as Morgan was nearing the Ohio line. Having been informed of Morgan's movement, General Henry B. Carrington was ordered to lead a trainload of troops to intercept him. Although the troops were all loaded into the cars at Indianapolis and ready to move at 3:00 p.m., a delay of six hours resulting from the fact that Carrington did not appear prevented any chance for success.⁵⁴ That same night, as Morgan's forces

⁵¹ Stamp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War*, 208-209; *Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel*, July 24, 1863.

⁵² Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 174. In a few cases citizens formed into small squads using their own horses, but such groups often caused more confusion than they were worth. One of the more comical incidents of the raid concerned a dispatch received in Indianapolis from one such enthusiastic group in Columbus that discovered themselves in a quandary. Their dispatch read, "A company of mounted volunteers has been formed here. They have no horses, what can be done [?]" The reply, "Let your company of 'mounted' men dismount and go afoot." S. Staufiser[?] to William H. H. Terrell, July 10, 1863, Governor's Telegraphic Correspondence, vol. XI, p. 193, Morton Papers; Terrell to Staufiser[?], *ibid.*

⁵³ Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 186-90; Pamela J. Bennett, ed., "Curtis R. Burke's Civil War Journal," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LXV (December, 1969), 310-11; *Seymour Times*, July 16, 1863; Oliver C. Haskell diary, July 10, 1863, Oliver C. Haskell Papers.

⁵⁴ Stamp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War*, 209; Klement, "Carrington and the Golden Circle Legend in Indiana," 46-47; the manuscript account of General Milo Hascall, who was finally ordered to replace Carrington, states: "At nine o'clock at night however he [Carrington] was not gone and upon Gen'l [Orlando B.] Willcox [military commander of the District of Indiana and Michigan] taking means to ascertain the reason, found unfit to trust with that or any other duty. He [Willcox] forthwith placed him under arrest and ordered me to proceed with the troops which

crossed into Ohio undisturbed by the final bungled attempt to engage him in Indiana, the state's brief experience with "the horrors of war" came to a close. Morgan would elude his pursuers for another twelve-and-a-half days in Ohio before he and about 250 of his men were finally captured near Salineville, Ohio, less than ten miles from the Pennsylvania border.

Nearly as soon as Morgan had left Indiana, the sense of danger subsided. At first there was a general sense of relief and a feeling of pride in having come through the calamity with relatively little loss and only a few casualties.⁵⁵ As time went on, however, the citizens of Indiana gradually became aware that their efforts had not been effective in slowing the advance of Morgan's cavalry. Letters from soldiers at the front and editorials in newspapers in other parts of the country pointed out these failures and effected much unease in Indiana.⁵⁶ The Louisville *Democrat*, for example, chided

I did, arriving just in time to ascertain beyond all question that the opportunity of intercepting Morgan had been lost by Carrington's drunkenness and inefficiency." Milo S. Hascall, "Report," Sept. 25, 1863, Hascall Manuscripts (Archives Division, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis), as cited in Klement, "Carrington and the Golden Circle Legend in Indiana," 46-47. Two attempts to locate this material as cited were unsuccessful. This report was cleaned up for official publication in Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, statistics and documents, 276-77. Carrington later asserted that even this edited account was erroneous. He claimed that he had "never served under Willcox, and never received an order from him." He also justified his absence on the night of July 13, in passing, "On the morning of July 14, finding that I had recovered from ahemorage the night before . . ." Henry B. Carrington to J. Frank Hanly, March 9, 1907, Henry B. Carrington Papers (Archives Division, Indiana Commission on Public Records, Indiana State Library).

⁵⁵ Among those deaths that did occur, in fact, most had not been caused by the enemy but had been self-inflicted. The worst of these resulted from the explosion of a caisson of ammunition in the city of Indianapolis and a case of mistaken identity by a new company of Home Guards. For the Indianapolis tragedy see Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, July 14, 1863. The latter incident was especially tragic because it occurred after Morgan had already exited the state. While responding to a report on the night of July 14 that Morgan had been defeated at Harrison, Ohio, and was retreating back into Indiana, Colonel Kline G. Shryock's newly formed regiment became doubled back on itself in the dark and halted. In the excitement of anticipating that the enemy was near, a gun was accidentally discharged; and, assuming that they were under attack, the raw troops fired blindly into each other resulting in the deaths of seven men and the wounding of over twenty. This incident crowned a week of military failures by the untrained Indiana volunteers and inspired the Lawrenceburg *Democratic Register* to lament that the people could "now appreciate the benefits of perfect discipline in the army." Lawrenceburg *Democratic Register*, July 17, 1863. See also *ibid.*, July 16, 1863; Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, July 17, 1863; Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 195-96; Company clerk of the Abington Home Guards, "The part the Abington Home Guards took in Morgan raid," *Company Clerk Book of the Abington Home Guards*, July[?], 1863, p. 27 (Indiana Historical Society Library).

⁵⁶ Some examples of criticism from the field follow: "I dont think they [state militia] deserve any more praise than other soldiers who have done their duty. I hope the brave home Cowards will have a chance to make their mark yet and be satisfied." Henry M. Scott to Edson [Adelman Wilder], September 1, 1863, Wilder Papers (Lilly Library, Indiana University); "I suppose you have been nearly frightened to death over Morgans raids . . . Ha! Ha! Morgans to much for the Militia Boys." Caleb Gill to "Sister [Clara]," July 26, 1863, George S. Johnson Papers (In-

its northern neighbor. Hoosiers had said "that if Morgan went over on that side of the river they would take no prisoners. They kept their word, and didn't take any."⁵⁷

Such criticism made the people of southern Indiana somewhat self-conscious that they had not lived up to their boasts of routing Morgan's force. They consoled themselves by claiming that Morgan's guerrilla tactics had not given them fair chance to do so. Praising the unified turnout to the raid, the Brookville *Franklin Democrat* announced, "Much to their regret, they [the Indiana Legion] have not had an opportunity to meet the foe, but it is only because Morgan's horses are fleet."⁵⁸ Along the same lines the New Albany *Daily Ledger* claimed that Morgan's escape proved "that a pursuing force cannot overtake a fleeing one."⁵⁹ A similar response came from a southern Indiana surgeon who wrote that though "it will be a surprise to the world how he [Morgan] did slip through so many fingers and not get caught, the way he did [so] was to dash right along and not stop to fight, he would wide down his horses and steal more as he went along."⁶⁰ To a state that had not succeeded in its first exposure to direct contact with the enemy, the interpretation of the actions of Morgan as unorthodox and criminal made for a reasonable excuse.

Politicians adopted a different approach to justify Indiana's unsuccessful response to the raid. Accepting the fact that Morgan had escaped them, the Republicans thanked the Confederate general for rejuvenating the state's patriotism and praised the nonpartisan unity that his presence had engendered. They believed that the invasion had finally succeeded in prompting people to make sufficient preparations for defense. The Indianapolis *Journal* exulted, "[the raid] has evolved our patriotism; it has given us a marvellous unity; it has organized our State forces, and rendered them efficient for any emergency; and it has effectively cowed down sympathy with rebels."⁶¹

The Democratic party also initially praised the patriotism displayed by its members. Democrats believed the response to the raid

diana Historical Society Library); "So if he [Morgan] creates much of an excitement in the state of Ind. I shall conclude what is left there are not very remarkable in *Spunk* & fighting qualities." Tom Prickett to Malinda Darr, July 12, 1863, Thomas Prickett Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library). See also John W. Vaught to "Sister [Matie A. Magill]," William C. Magill Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library); Stephen A. Miller to "Sister," July 17, 1863, Stephen A. Miller Letters (Indiana Historical Society Library).

⁵⁷ Reprinted with a defense of Indiana's actions in *Seymour Times*, August 6, 1863.

⁵⁸ Brookville *Franklin Democrat*, July 17, 1863.

⁵⁹ New Albany *Daily Ledger*, July 14, 1863.

⁶⁰ James Madden to C. J. Madden, July 15, 1863, Madden Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library).

⁶¹ Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, July 15, 1863. See also Madison *Daily Courier*, July 15, 1863; Richmond *Palladium*, July 17, 1863.

showed that the claims of disloyalty previously asserted by Republicans were unfounded. They had no intention, however, of allowing their political opponents to use the raid to their advantage. While the Indianapolis *Journal* praised Governor Morton for his quick action in organizing the state defenses both during and after the raid, the Democrats began to criticize his actions.⁶² Although partisan politics in the border counties took some time to reemerge as the people busied themselves with the work of organizing militia companies and tried to recoup their losses, in Indianapolis the *Sentinel* quickly began accusing the governor of negligence.⁶³ Since support for the response to the raid could easily have been misconstrued as support for the Republican administration, the Democrats criticized the poor leadership displayed. Before Morgan had exited the state, in fact, the Indianapolis *Sentinel* was subtly inquiring as to why better preparations had not been made for defense. The newspaper also criticized what it considered to be the governor's "indiscriminately" large request for troops, which the *Sentinel* claimed resulted in the loss of crops that were in the process of being harvested.⁶⁴ Shortly after the danger was over, the Democrats continued their complaints by charging the governor with poor judgment in his offer of Indiana troops to Ohio, whose people "manifested no sympathy [for] us, instead of sending them [Indiana troops] home to take care of their crops."⁶⁵

Realizing the political danger of praising too highly the loyalty of the Democratic response, the Republican press defended the governor and countered the charges of the *Sentinel* by contradicting its earlier profession of unity. In the process they did not go so far as to claim that the response to the raid was a success but insisted instead that the governor was not the one to blame for its short-

⁶² Morton sent Generals Carrington, John L. Mansfield, John Love, and James Hughes into the southern part of the state immediately after the raid to organize cavalry companies of the Indiana Legion to dissuade future invasions. For organization activities see New Albany *Daily Ledger*, July 15, 16, 20, 1863; Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, July 17, 1863; Lawrenceburg *Democratic Register*, July 24, 1863; Vevay *Reveille*, July 16, 1863; Cannelton *Reporter*, July 17, 1863; Paoli *American Eagle*, July 30, August 8, 1863; organization document for the St. Marys Guards, July 29, 1863, Augustus R. Markle Papers (Indiana Division, Indiana State Library); organization document for Veteran Company in the Indiana Legion in Brown County, September 4, 1863, Elijah H. C. Cravens Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library).

⁶³ For postraid regrouping and gathering of horses see Stuart, "Reminiscences," 75-80, William Stuart Papers; "A Story of The Civil War," Jefferson County mss. (Indiana Historical Society Library).

⁶⁴ Indianapolis *Daily State Sentinel*, July 10, 1863.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, July 14, 1863. For criticism of leadership see also *ibid.*, July 16, 23, 24, 1863; Lawrenceburg *Democratic Register*, July 17, 1863; Aurora *Commercial*, July 23, 1863. Strangely, the issue of Carrington was not exploited by the Indianapolis *Daily State Sentinel*, which, in fact, refuted an accusation of misconduct that was levied by the 108th Indiana Minute Men. Indianapolis *Daily State Sentinel*, July 24, 1863.

comings since he possessed no more power than to organize and arm troops to make them "ready for the use of the 'military authorities.'" The poor leadership, claimed the Indianapolis *Journal*, was the fault of the Federal authorities, especially Boyle, who "did a good deal less than nothing" and was responsible for not returning the regular Indiana troops to the state. Having thus absolved Morton from responsibility for the failure to capture Morgan, the *Journal* proceeded to defend the militia itself. The Guard, said the newspaper, was handicapped by poor information and a dependence on the rails for transportation.⁶⁶

In retaliation to the accusations of ineptitude on the part of Republican leaders and in an attempt to take the focus off the raid itself, the *Journal* also alleged, "there is no doubt that Morgan was invited here, and informed of all he wanted to know while here, and while on the way, by disloyal Democrats."⁶⁷ During the rest of July the *Journal* supplied "evidence" that Morgan had indeed been aided on his journey through the state and insinuated that his success could therefore be attributed to the help he received from the Indiana Democrats. Republicans backed these accusations by claiming that Morgan had presented at both Corydon and Salem a list of Indiana men who had modern arms, that he had no trouble finding good guides along the way, that the KGC gave him all the information he wanted to know, and that he requested specific sums of money from "persons who thought only their best friends knew they had it."⁶⁸ In order to dispel the Democratic argument that Morgan had treated Democrats as badly as or worse than Republicans, the Indianapolis *Journal* maintained that the Confederate general had done so only after obtaining what he wanted. Moreover, it claimed, such treatment proved only that even the despicable "horse thief" Morgan despised such lowly characters.⁶⁹ Other Republican organs issued similar opinions, and one even went so far as to insist that Democrats who had suffered losses in the raid should not be compensated by the government because they had issued the invitation to Morgan and thus deserved their fate.⁷⁰

Quickly the political hyperbole regained and even surpassed its previous levels. The bickering over who was at fault for the failure to capture Morgan and who had aided him while he was in the state soon gave way to the question of why he had come in the

⁶⁶ Indianapolis *Daily Journal*, July 27, 1863.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, July 18, 1863.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1863. See also Klement, "Carrington and the Golden Circle Legend in Indiana," *passim*; Klement, *Copperheads in the Middle West*, 156-57, *passim*.

⁶⁹ See note 68 above; see also Ramage, *Rebel Raider*, 173.

⁷⁰ Seymour *Times*, July 23, 1863.

first place. Again the two parties differed on their conclusions. The Republicans claimed that the extreme anti-administration politicking of the Democratic press had convinced Morgan that he would find support in Indiana. Conversely, the Democrats asserted that the Republicans were to blame for printing exaggerations that all Democrats were disloyal southern sympathizers who would jump at the chance to prove their devotion to the Confederate government. The Democracy insisted that "upon this slanderous abolition-republican party must rest, the entire odium and responsibility of Morgan's raid."⁷¹ Yet, because their primary purpose was to affix responsibility for the raid to the opposing party, editors and politicians took little notice of the facts surrounding the invasion. Upon closer scrutiny few of the accusations issued by either party can be accepted as legitimate.

In all probability neither party had coaxed Morgan into Indiana nor was solely responsible for the lack of preparation for defense. With regard to the contention that Morgan was invited into the state by either party's press or that the Confederate general intended to create a Copperhead uprising, little substantial evidence exists. All indications suggest that his actions were independently conceived. Despite the orders of his superiors, which granted him permission to make a raid in Kentucky to cover General Braxton Bragg's retreat to Chattanooga by disrupting Union supply lines, Morgan apparently intended from the outset to cross the Ohio.⁷² Three weeks prior to obtaining permission to enter Kentucky, in fact, he had ordered his right-hand man, Brigadier General Basil Duke, to send out scouts to "examine the fords of the upper Ohio."⁷³

Whether Morgan believed that by crossing the Ohio he could better protect Bragg by drawing away troops from the pursuit or whether he was simply fulfilling a dream of a northern invasion, his plans did not seem to include the expectation of aid from anyone outside his own command.⁷⁴ Indeed, the very fact that he sent

⁷¹ Lawrenceburg *Democratic Register*, July 24, 1863.

⁷² On June 18 Morgan obtained permission to make a raid on Louisville. His orders dictated that he would "as far as possible, break up and destroy the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, . . . [and], if practicable, destroy depots of supplies in the State of Kentucky, after which he will return to his present position." *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXIII, pt. 1, p. 817. Morgan, however, argued that if he were allowed to cross the Ohio River he would cause such pandemonium that Union troops massing in Kentucky presumably to reinforce General William S. Rosecrans would have to follow him in order to calm the populace. Bragg believed an invasion north of the Ohio River would be unnecessarily dangerous and considered Morgan's division too important to his command to be jeopardized in such a manner. Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 409-10; Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buell, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols., New York, 1956), III, 634-35; Ramage, *Rebel Raider*, 158-62.

⁷³ Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 411.

⁷⁴ Ramage, *Rebel Raider*, 158-82.

scouts to the upper Ohio prior to his raid indicates that his stay would not be a long one as he well realized that Federal troops from Kentucky as well as the Home Guards of Indiana and Ohio would not allow him to dally in either state.⁷⁵ Thomas H. Hines, who joined Morgan at the Ohio River and who would surely have dissuaded any ideas about attempting to rally the Copperheads had they existed, later asserted that the very success of Morgan's raid depended upon keeping the expedition "carefully concealed" and relying upon the "surprise and celerity of movement."⁷⁶

While partisan rhetoric was not the catalyst for Morgan's raid, neither was the poor preparation for defense against border raids entirely the fault of one party or the other. Instead, it was the result of several factors that were beyond the immediate control of either party. Perhaps the greatest detriment to the formation of an organized and reliable force was the fact that prior to the outbreak of war in 1861 there had not been an organized militia in the state for thirty years. Since the laws that remained were often fragmentary and had been developed for other types of threats, it was necessary for legislators ignorant of militia techniques themselves to develop new laws for the defense of the state.⁷⁷

In formulating a new militia law the legislators were bound by their constituents' conservative inclinations toward military service. The "*coercive principle*," which to be effective would have required the sacrifice of personal freedoms, "was so at variance with the habits of communities, entirely undisciplined in the school of national adversity, so repugnant to popular notions of personal immunity from restraint" that it would not have been generally accepted and would have been unenforceable. Conversely, the "*voluntary principle* had in its favor the element of popularity."⁷⁸ Americans had historically depended on this principle for all types of military service. The enthusiasm of the people in the opening months of the war seemed to indicate that this system would continue to meet the needs of the state adequately and at the same

⁷⁵ Duke, *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, 411.

⁷⁶ Thomas H. Hines, "The Northwest Conspiracy," *The Southern Bivouac: A Monthly Literary and Historical Magazine*, new ser., II (June, 1886–May, 1887), 442. The claim that Morgan was led through the state by Copperheads does not hold up either. Not only had several of Morgan's men previously lived in southern Indiana and knew the country but citizens along the way were also commandeered to lead the force. For examples see Bennett, "Curtis R. Burke's Civil War Journal," 306; Henry L. Stone to "Dear Father," July 8, 21, 1863, Henry Smith Lane Papers; Benjamin Franklin Ferris, "Rev. B. F. Ferris Tells How He Felt When Captured By Morgan: Morgan's Peculiar Treatment of Friend and Foe," report from meeting of the Ripley County Historical Society, July 15, 1923, pp. 3-6, Ripley County mss. (Indiana Division, Indiana State Library); Benjamin Franklin Ferris diary, July 12-15, 1863, Benjamin Franklin Ferris Papers (Indiana Historical Society Library); "A Story of The Civil War," Jefferson County mss.

⁷⁷ Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 136-37.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 137-38.

time would reduce the chance of arousing antiwar dissent. Voluntarism was thus accepted as the foundation of the 1861 Indiana Militia Law under which the Indiana Legion was organized.⁷⁹

Compounding the inherent problems of reliance on voluntary service, the Militia Law required no enrollment and provided no inducement to volunteer. Except for those expenses incurred while employed under a call of the governor for active service, all costs associated with the arming, clothing, organizing, and drilling of companies of the Legion had to be borne by the individuals who volunteered for them. When combined with the loss of time in the fields or at a business, these expenses made even the most patriotic men somewhat apathetic toward militia service. It is not surprising, therefore, that the organization and mobilization of Legion companies generally occurred only in the counties along the southern border of the state where the threat of raids existed, and even there the organization of those forces was difficult to maintain without the existence of a direct military threat. Except for the Morgan raid, in fact, most of the central and northern parts of the state seldom organized companies of the Legion.⁸⁰

While political leaders should not be dealt with too harshly for not creating a perfect militia system initially, they can be held accountable for failing to alter that system when its weaknesses were discovered. Unfortunately, the bills that were ostensibly devised to correct the problems usually had no chance of passing into law either because they lacked constituent support or because they were extremely partisan in nature. One such partisan bill was proposed by the Democrats in the truncated legislative session of 1863. Its main objective was to modify the Legion in such a way as to reduce the governor's influence over military patronage and his control over the Legion by forcing him to share some of those powers with the leading Democratic officials in the state government.⁸¹

Democrats, of course, tried to blame the Republican party for the state's lack of military preparation. It was, however, more the result of a flawed Militia Law and both parties' obstructions to the attempts to improve it that the state forces remained largely unorganized and poorly drilled at the time of the Confederate raids. After the Hines raid, in fact, the Republican administration had

⁷⁹ For the tradition of the voluntary principle of service in the United States see Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York, 1984), *passim*. The 1861 Militia Law of Indiana is reprinted as Document 47 in Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, statistics and documents, 247-55.

⁸⁰ Terrell, *Report of the Adjutant General*, I, 138-40. For descriptions of individual regiments see *ibid.*, 110-36 *passim*.

⁸¹ It was this bill that finally pushed the Republicans to bolt the session. Stamp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War*, 176-77; Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton*, I, 236-39.

made some attempts to bolster the state defenses, but these efforts came too late and were not generally supported as the majority of the population was seemingly unconcerned about the possibility of a raid. Since the war had already been raging for over two years by the summer of 1863 and the existing forces had successfully repulsed the Hines invasion, most Hoosiers saw no need to take time away from harvesting their crops to organize. Moreover, until the regular troops were called away from Indianapolis early in the raid, the state had been much better protected. Thus, despite Democratic allegations, the lack of preparation by the militia was due more to the adherence to the conservative principles that the Democratic party itself was defending than the negligence of Republican leaders.

With the Confederate incursions into southern Indiana in the summer of 1863, the seemingly impossible had become reality. Until faced with a real threat to their personal safety, politicians at home had been able to exaggerate the positions of their opponents in attempts to exploit popular fears and gain support for their own party. When legitimate threats did appear in the form of the invasions of Hines and Morgan, such political hyperbole was rendered obsolete. To a public that feared for its own physical safety, everyone's help was needed irrespective of political affiliations. Driven by these same fears and caught up in the excitement of the moment, the politicians and editors of both parties initially praised the nonpartisan response to the raids.

As Morgan left the state and the panic subsided, both Democrats and Republicans found the political situation in Indiana altered. In light of the overwhelming patriotic response displayed throughout the state, Republican charges of disloyalty no longer appeared valid. Democrats, however, did not attempt to exploit this fact. Since politically they could not take any credit for having been loyal to a Republican administration or having made a patriotic response to a war they did not support, they criticized the leadership that the Republicans had exhibited during the raid. Instead Democrats claimed that their enthusiasm had not been a patriotic response at all but a reaction necessary for self-defense. The fact that they had defended their homes and families against a group of guerrilla "horse thieves" indicated simply that they had upheld the law; it did not by any means represent support of the Republican administration or a rejection of the Democratic antiwar platform. Such criticism not only allowed the Democrats to maintain their status as an opposition party but also served to draw attention away from the fact that Indiana's poor performance against Morgan had been due, in part, to Democratic conservative ideals toward military service.

The Democrats' quick return to negative politics left their members open to the old allegations of disloyalty, and the Repub-

licans seized the opportunity to perpetuate them. The fact that the response to the raid had not led to a successful conclusion had left the Republicans open to criticism: in the absence of the Indiana General Assembly Morton virtually ran the state government by himself and stood to be blamed for the militia's failure to capture Morgan. Thus once again Republicans jumped at the chance to equate the Democratic position with treason and even elaborated upon their previous allegations.

In the end both political parties were more than happy to let the actual circumstances of the raids be forgotten. Recognition of the enthusiasm that had been exhibited in the defense of the state replaced the memory of the botched response to the military invasion. In turn, Hoosiers who were self-conscious about their own performance eagerly accepted such praise. Soon political hyperbole reverted to its preraid state and allowed all involved to ignore the troubling questions that had been raised by the invasions. A return to the politics of war proved far easier to debate in the absence of a direct military threat.

Holding a Course: Professor John J. Schlicher's Dismissal from Indiana State Normal

*Timothy R. Crumrin**

On January 3, 1918, members of the Board of Trustees of Indiana State Normal School gathered at Terre Haute for their monthly meeting. Uppermost on their agenda that cold day was the case of Dr. John J. Schlicher, a professor of Latin who had become a magnet for controversy. The previous spring Schlicher had delivered a chapel talk that had provoked much comment. Although a colleague later characterized the address as a "mild and thoughtful warning" induced by concern "lest super-heated American citizens . . . use undemocratic methods at home" in the pursuit of war aims,¹ a number of critics had questioned the professor's loyalty to the United States and his support of the war effort. The board had stood behind Schlicher in 1917; but it faced another crisis in January, 1918, this time precipitated by the professor's alteration of a patriotic organization's membership card. As a result of this second controversy the board voted not to renew his contract.²

According to the trustees the dismissal implied no disloyalty on Schlicher's part; rather, it resulted from his unwise actions, which had shown Indiana State Normal in an unflattering light. The Latin professor, the trustees said, had "by his utterances and behavior" seriously impaired "his value to the school"; thus, he was to leave the faculty "as early as practicable" and no later than June 30, 1918.³ Schlicher, who had not been called to speak for

* Timothy R. Crumrin is archivist/historian, Conner Prairie Museum, Fishers, Indiana. He expresses his thanks to Herbert J. Rissler, J. Thomas Brown, Mary-Margaret Byerman Bowles, and Robin Crumrin for their assistance in the preparation of this article.

¹ William O. Lynch, *A History of Indiana State Teachers College* (Terre Haute, Ind., 1946), 253. Indiana State Normal School became Indiana State Teachers College in 1929. *Ibid.*, 297.

² Minutes of the Indiana State Normal Board of Trustees, January 3, 1918, vol. VI, p. 459 (Indiana State University Archives, Terre Haute).

³ *Ibid.*